Europe 1.0 was an economic project and a peace project. That was not wrong. It was just unfinished.
A market was built and the hope was that politics would follow. It did not follow. Now people experience Brussels as regulation — but not as democracy. That is not a communication problem. That is a design flaw.
“Independent journalism is an anchor in a world that is increasingly difficult to see through.”
— Der Standard, 2026
What Europe Already Has
This is said too rarely: Europe is already a world power. Just a different kind from America or China.
No army that projects force. No ideology that is exported. But 450 million consumers — and that is power.
Whoever wants access to the European market plays by European rules. That applies to Apple and Meta just as much as to Chinese car manufacturers. The GDPR was not decided in Washington, not in Beijing — it was decided in Brussels, and today effectively applies worldwide. No corporation builds two data protection versions. It builds the European one. This is called the Brussels Effect. It is quiet power — but it is real power.
The EU’s GDP stands at around 18 trillion dollars. That is more than China. Less than the USA — but closer than it feels. This economic mass gives Europe leverage in trade negotiations, in sanctions regimes, in climate standards. When Europe says: whoever exports here must comply with CO₂ limits — that changes production conditions in India and Brazil. Not because Europe is morally superior. But because the market is too large to ignore.
Added to this is something rarer: Europe has learned from its history. Not completely. Not without contradictions. But institutionally built in is what most empires never had — self-limitation. Human rights, the rule of law, the prohibition of annexation: these are in the treaties because they were distilled from the pain of Europe’s own past.
That makes Europe morally credible. And simultaneously vulnerable.
In a world where Russia annexes, China buys, and America negotiates transactionally, adherence to principles becomes an attack surface. Whoever has values can be put under pressure — because the other side knows: Europe yields when argued with morally. The stronger one yields. That is not fairness. That is an exploitation strategy.
Europe must learn to be moral without being naive. That is the most difficult exercise. Keeping values — and not yielding when the pressure comes.
What 1.0 Got Wrong
Too much market. Too little voice.
The European Parliament cannot introduce legislation. Only the Commission can. People therefore elect a parliament that can react but not initiate. That is not a communication problem. It is written into the treaties.
Added to this is the unanimity principle — and what it means in practice: when the EU wanted to coordinate military aid for Ukraine in 2022, Hungary blocked the resolution for months. Not because Budapest had a better alternative. But because a veto is negotiating leverage. The system produces this behaviour. It is not abuse — it is the logic.
Europe 1.0 brought peace. That is no small thing. That is actually the greatest thing. But peace alone is no longer sufficient as an argument. The generation that still knew the war is dying. The next needs a different reason.
Who Leads
France thinks Europe as a power project. From de Gaulle to Macron: that is continuity across governments, built into foreign policy as into the constitution. Macron is under domestic pressure in 2026 — but the grande nation logic survives every president. It is institutional, not personal.
Germany goes along. Organised, financed, hesitant — but reliable once the framework is in place. The Corona recovery fund was the clearest signal: Berlin gave up a red line it had held for twenty years. Not out of conviction alone. Because the moment was big enough.
Austria brings things to conclusion — when it wants to. That sounds small. It is not. Compromise is the most difficult art in politics: not capitulating, but formulating in such a way that both sides feel they have won. Vienna has demonstrated this in EU negotiations more than once. Whether this is Habsburg influence or simply the position between the blocs — it is present. The question is whether it is put to use.
What a Superpower EU Can Do in Foreign Policy
Europe speaks in world politics with 27 voices. Sometimes they say the same thing. Often they do not.
That is the real failing. Not that Europe lacks power — but that it does not deploy it. A continent of 450 million people, the world’s largest single market, and the densest multilateral experience in history sits at the table of great powers — and whispers.
A capable EU would change that. Concretely:
Trade policy as foreign policy. Europe has already proven that market access changes behaviour. Whoever wants access to the EU market adopts social standards, environmental requirements, rule of law criteria. That is not idealism — that is conditionality. The same logic works geopolitically: access in exchange for behaviour. Europe could deploy this systematically, rather than improvising case by case.
Enlargement as strategy. EU membership has stabilised more democracies than any military alliance. Poland, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states — the accession process built institutions, reduced corruption, anchored the rule of law. That is influence with a long horizon. The Western Balkans has been waiting for twenty years. Ukraine poses the question anew. Who is admitted and who is not — that is geopolitics.
A common voice in conflicts. Today France negotiates with Moscow, Germany with Beijing, Hungary with both simultaneously against the rest. An EU with majority decisions in foreign policy could act in a unified way — and would be far harder to divide. Divide et impera only works as long as Europe allows itself to be divided.
And defence. Not as a replacement for NATO — but as a complement that does not depend on Washington. A European defence capacity is not a fantasy of rearmament. It is the precondition for Europe being able to decide for itself what it does in a crisis.
None of this is a vision for 2050. The building blocks are ready. What is missing is the political will to put them together — and the recognition that restraint in a world of great powers is not a virtue. It is a vacuum. And vacuums get filled.
What 2.0 Needs
A European public sphere. Not national media reporting on Europe. European media thinking Europe.
Capacity to act in security and foreign policy. Without America as a guarantor. The dependency was comfortable. It is over.
Less unanimity. More majority decisions. That means: some will be outvoted. That is democracy. It sometimes hurts. It works nonetheless.
And social balance. Between north and south. Between east and west. Without that, the division remains — and division produces populism.
How to Introduce 2.0
The model exists. Not in Brussels. In Bern.
Switzerland never joined — and yet demonstrates most of what Europe 2.0 would need. Direct democracy: citizens vote on concrete questions, not just on parties every four years. Concordance principle: governing means including all relevant forces — not majority against minority, but majority with minority. Multilingualism as the normal condition: four languages, one state, no culture war over it.
The paradox: because Switzerland is not in the EU, it cannot introduce the model. It benefits from the market without the burden of the compromises. That is clever. It is also free-riding.
So: France proposes it. Germany makes it financially viable. Austria translates it — between east and west, between the north that pays and the south that needs. Not because Vienna is the capital of Europe. But because compromise needs a language that everyone understands.
Direct democracy at EU level means: more demand. More explanation. More patience. And in the end: more legitimacy. Whoever has voted themselves can no longer experience the outcome as something foreign.
That takes time. That is not a constitutional reform for one legislative term. But it is the only path that does not wait for the next shock — but starts beforehand.
The Shock Is Coming
Europe 2.0 needs a catalyst. 1.0 emerged after the Second World War. Not because people suddenly thought European. But because the pain was great enough.
The next shock is coming. War, climate collapse, economic rupture — something. The question is not whether. The question is whether Europe then grows together or falls apart.
Both are possible. History shows: crises can unite. And they can destroy.
What makes the difference: whether enough people thought beforehand about what should come after.
That is the task now. Not waiting. Thinking.
By René Jochum and Claude (Anthropic). License: CC-BY-4.0.